


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OFFICE OF
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OFFICE OF TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION



Ferry Safety Investigation

Interim Factual Statement

Collision of Manly Ferry *COLLARROY* At Number 2 Wharf Circular Quay

19 September 2005



OTSI File Reference: 04202

The Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) is an independent NSW agency whose purpose is to improve transport safety through the investigation of accidents and incidents in the rail, bus and ferry industries.

Established on 1 January 2004 by the *Transport Administration Act 1988*, the Office is responsible for determining the causes and contributing factors of accidents and to make recommendations for the implementation of remedial safety action to prevent recurrence.

OTSI investigations are conducted under powers conferred by the *Rail Safety Act 2002* and the *Passenger Transport Act 1990*. OTSI investigators normally seek to obtain information cooperatively when conducting an accident investigation. However, where it is necessary to do so, OTSI investigators may exercise statutory powers to interview persons, enter premises and examine and retain physical and documentary evidence. Where OTSI investigators exercise their powers of compulsion, information so obtained cannot be used against those persons providing information in criminal or civil proceedings.

OTSI investigation reports are submitted to the Minister for Transport for tabling in both Houses of Parliament. Following tabling, OTSI reports are published on its website www.otsi.nsw.gov.au

Information about OTSI is available on its website or from its offices at

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The Office of Transport Safety Investigation also provides a Confidential Safety Information Reporting facility for rail, bus and ferry industry employees. The CSIRS reporting telephone number is 1800 180 828.

Overview

At about 1.15PM on 19 September 2005, the Manly service passenger ferry *Collaroy*, a Freshwater class vessel operated by Sydney Ferries Corporation (SFC), was inbound to Circular Quay for its berth at No.3 West Wharf. As it entered Sydney Cove, the master advises that the vessel's propulsion control failed, leaving him with only rudder control.

The vessel headed towards No. 2 West Wharf where the SFC Ferry *Golden Grove* was embarking passengers. The master of the *Collaroy* informed SFC Control of his predicament and all passengers were evacuated from the *Golden Grove* and No. 2 West Wharf. The master also dropped an anchor and attempted to steer the *Collaroy* away from the *Golden Grove*.

The *Collaroy* then collided with the northern end of the pontoon at No. 2 Wharf. There was extensive damage to the pontoon's roof structure but only superficial damage to the *Collaroy*. The *Collaroy* was subsequently taken out of service and No. 2 Wharf was closed pending survey and repair action.

Sydney Ferries Corporation advised that there were no serious injuries to passengers or crew and that although they received a number of reports from passengers complaining of minor injuries, no-one required hospitalisation or ambulance treatment at the time.

Investigation

An OTSI marine investigator deployed to Circular Quay and commenced the preliminary investigation.

The Chief Investigator has determined that the circumstances and nature of this incident warrant formal investigation by OTSI in accordance with Section 46BA of the *Passenger Transport Act 1990*. The Chief Investigator has also determined that a number of like incidents throughout the period 2004-2005, involving the Freshwater class of ferries, will be the subject of a separate 'systemic' investigation.

OTSI's investigation into the 19 September collision will seek to:

- a. establish why the accident happened and what caused it;
- b. identify whether there are any organisational, operational, logistic, financial, administrative, human or other factors which compromised vessel operating safety systems and contributed to the cause/s of the accident;
- c. ascertain whether this type of accident had been, or should have been, anticipated and whether there were appropriate contingency plans in place to manage the related risk/s;
- d. assess the effectiveness of emergency actions that were initiated in response to the accident;
- e. make recommendations to prevent, or at the very least minimise the potential for, recurrence of this type of accident, and
- f. propose any course of action that would enhance the provision of safe ferry services.

Report

Once completed, OTSI's investigation report will be tabled in Parliament by the Minister for Transport as required by Section 46D of the *Passenger Transport Act 1990*. When the Report has been tabled, copies will be made available to all directly interested parties and will be published on the OTSI website.