

Nana Glen webinar—5 July 2023

Responses to unanswered questions during event

Question: The derailment site has signs warning of unknown contamination in the area. What is being done to identify and make the area safe? I have concerns about my safety and that of my crew/passengers should an emergency occur requiring retraining at the site.

Answer: The following advice was supplied by the ARTC.

The Nana Glen derailment resulted in approximately 8000L of diesel and oils leaking from the 3 locomotives. Most of these hydrocarbons were washed away in the rain/flood event. Following the derailment, ARTC was issued a clean-up notice from the NSW EPA to appropriately investigate the spill and impact.

ARTC contracted Contamination Consultant Cavvanba to complete this investigation. It was identified that:

- The top 3m of soil around where Loco 3 was tipped on its side was contaminated with hydrocarbons.
- The soil within the drainage channel adjacent to where Loco 2 came to rest and nearby culvert inlet was impacted by hydrocarbons.
- It was identified there was a potential for this contamination to impact ground water.
- To investigate groundwater impacts, groundwater monitoring wells were installed across the site in the derailment area.
- No groundwater contamination was identified from initial testing and follow up testing.
- A final close out monitoring event will be conducted in August/September 2023 as required from initial investigation report. This is in process of being organised with the consultant.
- A site EMP was developed for ground disturbing works in the area to cover out maintenance activities.
- Appropriate signage was installed for hydrocarbon impacts in soils as recommended by the EMP.

There would be no risk to crew passengers from any train services disembarking in this area as they would not be disturbing the ground. It is also a lower risk due to being hydrocarbons as opposed to other forms of contamination from dangerous goods, asbestos etc.

Signage at the site isn't for 'unknown contamination in area' but rather 'Known contamination in this area'.

Question: After 48 years on the locomotive and the last 25 years spend training crew, the current executive management of rail operators lack the knowledge required, the continued dumbing down of training requirements to save time and costs wanted by operators will not help. Currently nothing in any locomotive crew training requires knowledge of what actions and considerations the driver should consider in events like this, enforcement of basic safety requirements is required. Will OTSI pursue the need for safety?

Answer: OTSI examines training and competency and risk assessment and management as part of the investigation process. We make recommendations based on findings from individual incidents. By identifying safety issues and sharing these recommendations and lessons learned, we work to improve transport safety outcomes. We influence and advocate for change through ongoing regular interaction with transport operators, regulators and other stakeholders at meetings and forums.

In relation to the Nana Glen incident, the final investigation report notes that two trains which had earlier passed through the derailment site – including an XPT passenger service which passed through 27 minutes before the

derailment – had not reported a condition affecting the network. These drivers had not been provided with guidance for operating through severe weather conditions and floodwater. For this reason, we have made recommendations to both the ARTC and Pacific National that they develop guidance for train crew to respond to and report extreme wet weather events or floodwater in the rail corridor.

Question: In the UK there is / was a NIR - National Incident Reporting process whereby safety issues / failures etc are required to be communicated throughout railway organisations. Would similar mandated system requiring lessons to be shared quickly and effectively, be of use to the railway family?

Answer: Rail safety incidents as defined by Rail Safety National Law are reported to and collated by the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR). The ONRSR Safety Alerts are issued as needed to inform accredited rail transport operators and the broader rail industry of current and emerging safety issues. The ONRSR also publishes safety messages periodically to focus on specific areas of rail safety concern, to share information between the regulator and the rail industry, and to identify positive steps to enhance rail safety.

As the independent 'no-blame' transport safety investigator for NSW, OTSI investigates incidents and accidents to identify and understand contributing safety factors and underlying issues with the aim of enhancing transport safety by sharing safety lessons and insights with those organisations that can implement actions to improve safety.

We promote our investigation reports and findings to the rail industry through various communications channels and ongoing engagement with operators, the ONRSR, and bodies such as the Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board, and Australasian Railway Association. OTSI also produces Safety Alerts and Advisories to quickly share information with the industry insights arising from incidents and accidents. We are working to increase the number of Alerts and Advisories we produce for rail.

Question: Can you see a link between the report findings and the broader network condition not just network resilience?

Answer: Network resilience generally includes the current and future needs of rail operations. One of the important safety lessons out of the Nana Glen investigation focused on the critical importance of effective risk identification and management for extreme weather events ie flooding. This has relevance for the management of existing assets and planning future infrastructure, and for operational management both in normal operations and in response to extreme weather. However, it is difficult to make links between a single flooding event.